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On the heels of news media accounts of corporate wrongdoing, the issue
of corporate accountability periodically rises in prominence. One method by
which shareholders attempt to hold corporations accountable for alleged
wrongdoing is the derivative lawsuit. Because of judicial reluctance to
interfere with the processes of an independent board of directors, plaintiffs
must overcome the business judgment rule presumption in favor of the
corporation in order to prevail. The business judgment rule, along with the
board’s ability to appoint an independent “special litigation committee” to
determine whether the corporation should join the lawsuit or have it
dismissed, significantly reduce the plaintiffs’ chances of success in derivative
lawsuits.
The recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision in Janssen v. Best &
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1

Flanagan does not reach the important issue of which version of the
business judgment rule Minnesota courts will apply in derivative lawsuits
against for-profit and nonprofit corporations. However, the court’s
reasoning in resolving the case suggests that the strict, procedural version of
the business judgment rule will be retained the next time the court reaches
2
the issue. This note reviews the court’s reasoning and argues that both the
theoretical justifications behind the business judgment rule and sound
economic policy dictate that Minnesota’s strict application of the business
judgment rule is the correct approach in the for-profit context. In the
nonprofit context, this note argues, the business judgment rule justifications
do not apply as directly and traditional nonprofits should be subject to more
exacting judicial review.

I. INTRODUCTION: PROTECTING BUSINESS JUDGMENT
What do the Ford Motor Company, the Chicago Cubs, Disney
and Martha Stewart have in common? Each participated in
litigation where the court wrestled with the question of how much
3
deference to grant to board of director decisions. Defendants
often raise the business judgment rule in cases disputing the major
corporate controversies reflected in newspaper headlines such as
“hostile” takeovers, excessive executive compensation, and insider
4
trading. But the rule can also protect corporate boards against
more routine claims such as lack of due care in corporate decision5
making. The business judgment rule is simply a presumption
made by the reviewing court that the board’s decision was

1. 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003).
2. For a contrary view see Eric J. Moutz, Janssen v. Best & Flanagan: At Long
Last, the Beginning of the End for the Auerbach Approach in Minnesota?, 30 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 489 (2003) (arguing less deferential judicial review is desirable
in general and that Janssen provides hints that the Minnesota Supreme Court is
leaning toward less-deferential review).
3. See Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833
A.2d 961 (Del. Ch. 2003) (failure to monitor CEO’s alleged insider trading);
Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. Super. Ct. 2000) (executive compensation at
Disney); Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (refusal to erect
lights at home field of Chicago Cubs); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668
(Mich. 1919) (amount of declared dividends).
4. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)
(corporate takeover); Brehm, 746 A.2d 244 (executive compensation); Beam, 833
A.2d 961 (insider trading).
5. Compare Brehm, 746 A.2d at 267 (dismissing duty of care claims) with Smith
v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985) (finding board grossly negligent).
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6

informed and made in good faith.
Without question, the business judgment rule is an important
7
component of corporate law. For more than a century and a half,
the business judgment rule has been the primary means by which
8
courts have reviewed ordinary board decisions. Application of the
9
rule, however, is uncertain and full of “nuance and complexity.”
The root of this uncertainty is in the delicate balance the rule
attempts to maintain between board independence and authority
10
on one hand and legitimate shareholder claims on the other.
11
Recently, in Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, the Minnesota
Supreme Court addressed the issue of how the business judgment
rule applies to the board of directors of a nonprofit organization.
The court decided that the business judgment rule does protect
nonprofit board decisions, but did not reach the issue of which
particular version of the business judgment rule applies to
12
nonprofits in order to decide the case. This note uses Janssen as
6. See infra Part II.A.-C.
7. See Michael J. Kennedy, The Business Judgment Syllogism—Premises Governing
Board Activity, in TECH. & EMERGING GROWTH M&AS 2002 at 285, 327 (PLI Corp. L.
& Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 1316, 2002), available at WL 1316
PLI/Corp 285 (stating that there are “perhaps thousands” of cases that “peel the
onion of the business judgment rule’s parameters”).
8. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 7 (5th ed. 1998).
9. See Kennedy, supra note 7, at 287. See also Henry G. Manne, Our Two
Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 270 (1967) (calling the
business judgment rule “one of the least understood concepts in the entire
corporate field”).
10. See In re PSE & G Shareholder Litigation, 801 A.2d 295, 306 (N.J. 2002).
To resolve this dispute, we are required to analyze the interplay
between two established, but sometimes competing, corporate
doctrines. The first doctrine accords protection to corporate decisionmakers to be free of unwarranted judicial intrusion when making
business judgments on behalf of the corporation. The second tenet
recognizes a shareholder’s ability to redress perceived wrongs against
the corporation by filing a derivative lawsuit when the entity’s
managers refuse to act.
Id. See also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 563-574 (2003) (contrasting the “shareholder
primacy” and “director primacy” models of corporate governance); Donald C.
Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms, and the Unintended
Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 820-22 (2001)
(presenting a social-cognitive analysis of board members’ balancing of
independence and accountability).
11. 662 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 2003).
12. See id. at 888 n.5 (“We do not adopt a particular version of the business
judgment rule for use with Minnesota nonprofit organizations today . . . [because
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an opportunity to explore the underlying justifications of the
business judgment rule and to recommend a framework for
applying the rule in future Minnesota cases.
First, this note develops the history of the shareholder
13
derivative lawsuit and special litigation committee. In addition,
the historical roots of the business judgment rule and the
14
important modern formulations of the rule are described. Next,
the note discusses and critiques the traditional policy justifications
15
for the rule. Finally, the facts of the case and the court’s analysis
16
are described and a new framework for applying the business
judgment rule to nonprofits is presented and discussed in light of
17
Janssen. Janssen hints that the deferential, one-step version of the
business judgment rule still applies to Minnesota for-profit
18
Strong economic justifications support this
corporations.
19
position.
Finally, this note recommends that this deferential
version of the rule should extend only to nonprofit entities
displaying salient features in common with for-profit
20
corporations.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit
A derivative lawsuit is a vehicle through which a third party
(often a shareholder) may bring a claim on behalf of a corporation
21
or other entity. The defendant in a shareholder derivative lawsuit
is often a present or former director, officer or controlling
shareholder of the corporation, but may instead be a third party
the] investigation failed the most minimal version of a business judgment
rule. . . .”).
13. See infra Parts II.A.-B.
14. See infra Part II.C.
15. See infra Part II.D.
16. See infra Part III.
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See id.
20. See infra Part IV.B.
21. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 455 (7th ed. 1999) (defining derivative action
as a “suit by a beneficiary of a fiduciary to enforce a right belonging to the
fiduciary”). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1 (“[A] derivative action brought by one or
more shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or . . .
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which
may properly be asserted by it . . . .”).
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22

against whom the corporation has a possible claim. A derivative
action is different than a direct shareholder or class-action lawsuit
in that the corporation, and not the shareholder/plaintiff, is the
23
24
real party in interest in the action.
The origin of the modern derivative action is traced to
eighteenth century British courts taking equity jurisdiction to
25
enforce the fiduciary duties of directors of joint stock and
26
charitable corporations. American courts recognized the concept
of corporate directors as fiduciaries through an analogy to trusts.
Early cases allowed shareholder recovery from corporations for
27
misused funds. Later cases with third-party actors as defendants
required courts to introduce the concept of derivative actions in
order to avoid the possibility of dual recovery (by both the
28
corporation and the shareholder) for a single injury.
While most shareholder derivative actions are dismissed or
29
settled before they go to trial, the risk of an adverse outcome to
30
the corporation is real in both the duty of care and duty of
22. DEBORAH DEMOTT, SHAREHOLDER DERIVATIVE ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 1:01 (2002).
23. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 70 (5th ed. 1994)
(defining real party in interest as the party possessing the substantive right to be
enforced and not necessarily the party who will ultimately benefit from recovery).
24. DEMOTT, supra note 22, § 101, at 1-2. Procedurally, this means that the
corporation is an indispensable party and the shareholder bringing the action is a
nominal plaintiff responsible for joining the corporation in the action. Ross v.
Bernard, 396 U.S. 531, 538 (1970). See also Koster v. Am. Lumbermens Mut. Cas.
Co., 330 U.S. 518, 522-23 (1947) (examining the jurisdictional implications of
properly aligning the adverse parties in a derivative action).
25. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 640 (defining a fiduciary as
“one who must exercise a high standard of care in managing another’s money or
property”; listing specifically the fiduciary duties of “good faith, trust, confidence
and candor”).
26. See generally Bert Prunty, The Shareholders’ Derivative Suit: Notes on Its
Derivation, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980, 981-82 (1957) (tracing the impulse behind the
derivative action from early efforts by kings and chancellors to protect group
members against their delegates to its modern American form).
27. See, e.g., Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222, 226 (N.Y. Ch. 1832) (“if the
corporation was still under the control of those who must be made the defendants
in the suit, the stockholders . . . would be permitted to file a bill in their own
names”); Taylor v. Miami Exp. Co., 5 Ohio 162, 167 (1831) (“if this corporation
and directors were trustees and agents of the stockholders, can they not call them
to account for the funds placed under their care[?]”).
28. See also Prunty, supra note 26, at 991-92 (discussing these decisions and
the logical leap taken by courts in allowing shareholders to assert corporate
rights).
29. DEMOTT, supra note 22, § 1:01, at 3.
30. In most jurisdictions the current standard of care expected of corporate
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31

loyalty contexts. From the corporation’s perspective, the adverse
outcome is forced participation in a lawsuit.
If the
plaintiff/shareholder brings the suit strictly for nuisance value or in
hopes that a settlement will be less expensive for the corporation
than the risk of the lawsuit moving forward, it is termed a “strike
32
suit.” The law developed the special litigation committee and the
business judgment rule to provide corporations with efficient
means to terminate lawsuits running counter to their legitimate
33
interests.
B. The Special Litigation Committee
Starting in the 1970s it became common practice for boards of
directors to establish a special litigation committee of independent
directors and to delegate to the committee the decision whether to
34
join a derivative lawsuit. It is important that the committee be
granted actual and meaningful authority to decide the matter and
not merely be empowered to recommend a course of action to the
35
board for ultimate approval.
Special litigation committees are
directors is such care and diligence that an ordinarily careful and prudent person
could reasonably be expected to exercise on behalf of the corporation under
similar circumstances. See 1 JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, COX & HAZEN ON
CORPORATIONS § 10:03 (2d ed. 2003). In practice this standard of care is
decreased in the shareholder derivative context because the business judgment
rule requirements must also be met.
31. The duty of loyalty encompasses officer or director self-dealing, conflictof-interest transactions, the personal usurping of corporate opportunity and other
situations where officers or directors act to protect their personal self-interest and
neglect to serve the interests of the corporation and its stockholders. 1 COX &
HAZEN, supra note 30, § 10.11, at 517.
32. See Dennis J. Block, et al., The Role of the Business Judgment Rule in
Shareholder Litigation at the Turn of the Decade, 45 BUS. LAW. 469, 473 (1990)
(defining “strike suits” as actions brought to “induce settlements beneficial to the
named plaintiff or his counsel” and not to remedy wrongs done to the
corporation) (footnote omitted).
33. See infra Part II.B-C. For a treatment of special litigation committees as
alternative dispute resolution devices, see Daniel S. Kleinberger & Imanta
Bergmanis, Direct vs. Derivative, or “What’s a Lawsuit Between Friends in an
‘Incorporated Partnership?’ ” 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1203, 1235 (1996).
34. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 30, § 15.08, at 939. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon
Corp. 418 F. Supp. 508, 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (“Indeed, in carrying out its
investigation and in reaching its conclusions, the Special Committee exercised the
full powers of the Board.”); Lasker v. Burks, 404 F. Supp. 1172, 1180 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (“If the minority directors were truly disinterested and independent the
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Board.”), rev’d, 567 F.2d 1208
(2d Cir. 1978), rev’d and remanded, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
35. See Lawrence J. Fox, The Special Litigation Committee Investigation: No
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seen as an efficient method of judging the corporate interest in a
derivative lawsuit when the court may see the decision of the full
36
board as colored by self-interest. However, the degree to which
such committees are able to exercise truly independent judgment
over actions of their board colleagues has been repeatedly
37
questioned. Nearly all jurisdictions protect independent special
litigation committee decisions under some formulation of the
38
business judgment rule.
C. The Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a deferential standard of judicial
review of corporate director conduct that presumes directors act in
good faith, on an informed basis, and “in the honest belief that
39
their actions are in the corporation’s best interests.”
This
presumption protects director conduct that can be attributed to
40
Justice Brandeis succinctly
any rational business purpose.
Undertaking for the Faint of Heart, in INTERNAL CORPORATE INVESTIGATIONS 299, 30203 (Brad D. Brian & Barry F. McNeil eds., 2d ed. 2003).
36. 2 COX & HAZEN, supra note 30, § 15.08, at 940.
37. This tendency not to deliver negative outcomes onto one’s board of
director colleagues has been termed “ ‘there but for the grace of God go I’
empathy.” Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 787 (Del. 1981). The
tendency has also been referred to as “structural bias.” See, e.g., Miller v. Register
& Tribune Syndicate, Inc. 336 N.W.2d 709, 716 (Iowa 1983) (“The central theme
of these concerns has been focused on the ‘structural bias’ approach, which
suggests that it is unrealistic to assume that the members of independent
committees are free from personal, financial or moral influences which flow from
the directors who appoint them.”).
38. Iowa is the most notable exception. Iowa does not provide deferential
review of special litigation committee decisions. Instead, the corporation is
required to apply for a court-appointed panel, thereby avoiding “structural bias,”
in order to be protected under the business judgment rule. See Matthew G. Dore,
The Duties and Liabilities of an Iowa Corporate Director, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 207, 240
(2002).
39. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 21, at 192. The business judgment
rule began to appear in court decisions in essentially its modern form in the mid
nineteenth century in the United States. See, e.g., In re Spering, 71 Pa. 11, 24
(1872) (“they are not liable for mistakes of judgment, even though they may be so
gross as to appear to us absurd and ridiculous, provided they are honest and
provided they are fairly within the scope of the powers and discretion confided to
the managing body”). See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW, 1836-1937, 59-63 (1991) (tracing the historical development of shareholder
derivative suits and the business judgment rule).
40. See, e.g., Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (“A
board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its
decisions will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business
purpose. A court under such circumstances will not substitute its own notions of
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formulated the business judgment rule as follows:
Courts seldom interfere to control such discretion intra
vires the corporation, except where the directors are
guilty of misconduct equivalent to a breach of trust, or
where they stand in a dual relation which prevents an
unprejudiced exercise of judgment; and, as a rule, only
after application to the stockholders, unless it appears
that there was no opportunity for such application, that
such application would be futile (as where the
wrongdoers control the corporation), or that the delay
41
involved would defeat recovery.
To be successful, a plaintiff must plead and prove sufficient
42
Where the business
facts to overcome this presumption.
judgment rule presumption is overcome by the plaintiff, the
directors bear the burden of proving the fairness of the conduct
43
being challenged. In practice, the difference between deferential
review in light of the presumption in favor of directors and more
rigorous review requiring that directors prove fairness often
44
determines the outcome of derivative litigation.
The business judgment rule places emphasis on the board’s
decision-making process rather than on the substance of the
45
decision.
The fact that a majority of independent and
disinterested directors has approved of board action nearly always
means that a court will apply the deferential business judgment
standard of review if the action is later attacked for a breach of the
46
duty of care.
Deferential business judgment review is a broadly accepted
what is or is not sound business judgment.”).
41. United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 26364 (1917) (footnote omitted).
42. 1 DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS 18 (5th ed. 1998).
43. Id. at 18-19.
44. Id. at 19.
45. Brazen v. Bell Atl. Corp., 695 A.2d 43, 49 (Del. 1997) (“It applies when
that decision is questioned and the analysis is primarily a process inquiry. Courts
give deference to directors’ decisions reached by a proper process, and do not
apply an objective reasonableness test in such a case to examine the wisdom of the
decision itself.”) (footnotes omitted).
46. Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 191 (Del. 1988), overruled on different
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). “We view a board of
directors with a majority of outside directors, such as this Board, as being in the
nature of overseers of management.” Id.
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47

common law concept accepted as a presumption in the
48
49
influential state of Delaware and at least twenty-five other
50
51
52
53
jurisdictions including Minnesota, Iowa, and Wisconsin. Two
distinct business judgment rule philosophies have emerged that
come to different conclusions about the scope of judicial review
under the rule and the conditions under which a corporate board
54
can terminate a shareholder derivative lawsuit.
1. New York’s One-Step Approach
New York’s approach, exemplified in Auerbach v. Bennett, is the
most deferential in that it trusts decisions by disinterested directors
47. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31, Note on Directors’ Liability (2000)
(“this standard of judicial review for director conduct—deeply rooted in the case
law—presumes that, absent self-dealing or other breach of the duty of loyalty,
directors’ decision-making satisfies the applicable legal requirements”).
48. Delaware precedent in corporate law matters is very influential in forming
what some commentators call the “corporate judiciary” and is heavily cited in
other jurisdictions. DAVID SCIULI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY 15 (2001).
New York, New Jersey, and California are other influential jurisdictions in this
regard. Id.
49. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) overruled on other
grounds by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) (“It is a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed
basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best
interests of the company.”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)
(“Under Delaware law, the business judgment rule is the offspring of the
fundamental principle . . . that the business and affairs of a Delaware corporation
are managed by or under its board of directors.”) (citing DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
141(a)).
50. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 22-24 (listing jurisdictions that accept the
business judgment rule presumption and providing citations to cases).
51. Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 845 (D. Minn. 1986)
(“Under Minnesota law, there is a strong presumption protecting a director’s
business decision.”), aff’d in part and vacated in part on other grounds, 811 F.2d 414
(8th Cir. 1987); Westgor v. Grimm, 318 N.W.2d 56, 58 (Minn. 1982) (stating that
“we have traditionally been reluctant to interfere with the inner workings of a
corporation”).
52. Cookies Food Prods., Inc. v. Lakes Warehouse Distrib., Inc., 430 N.W.2d
447, 453 (Iowa 1988) (holding that “in duty of care challenges the burden of
proof is on plaintiffs because of the business judgment rule which affords directors
the presumption that their decisions are informed, made in good faith, and
honestly believed by them to be in the best interests of the company”).
53. R.D. Smith & Co. v. Preway Inc., 644 F. Supp. 868, 877 (W.D. Wis. 1986)
(“If plaintiffs are able to prove their allegations that the board’s consideration of
alternatives was merely perfunctory, this would mean that defendants did not meet
their duty of good faith and reasonable investigation.”).
54. See 2 BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 1689-1702 (providing a comprehensive
review of business judgment rule litigation including numerous citations).
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whether to pursue derivative claims as long as the decision is
55
preceded by a good-faith investigation. The court explains that
judges are especially qualified to review the investigative
56
procedures undertaken by a board or committee. However, the
substantive decision to terminate the lawsuit “involving as it did the
weighing and balancing of legal, ethical, commercial, promotional,
public relations, fiscal and other factors familiar to the resolution
of many if not most corporate problems” is beyond the scope of
57
judicial review.
The appropriate scope of review of board investigatory
procedures under the Auerbach standard can be gleaned from the
58
decision. The court notes that the board committee “promptly
engaged eminent special counsel to guide its deliberations and to
advise it” and “reviewed the prior work of the audit committee,
testing its completeness, accuracy and thoroughness by
59
interviewing representatives” of the outside auditors.
The
committee also reviewed “transcripts of the testimony of 10
corporate officers and employees before the Securities and
Exchange Commission” and reviewed documents collected during
60
an earlier investigation conducted by a law firm.
Finally,
“[i]ndividual interviews were conducted with the directors found to
have participated in any way” in the questioned activities and
“[q]uestionnaires were sent to and answered by each of the
61
corporation’s nonmanagement directors.” While stating that the
court’s determination of which investigative methods are
appropriate and sufficient “must always turn on the nature and
characteristics of the particular subject being investigated,” the
court found nothing in the record to “raise a triable issue of fact as
62
to the good-faith pursuit of its examination by that committee.”
55. 393 N.E.2d 994, 1002 (N.Y. 1979) (“While the court may properly inquire
as to the adequacy and appropriateness of the committee’s investigative
procedures and methodologies, it may not under the guise of consideration of
such factors trespass in the domain of business judgment.”).
56. Id. (“[C]ourts are well equipped by long and continuing experience and
practice . . . . In fact they are better qualified in this regard than are corporate
directors in general.”).
57. Id. at 1002 (“Inquiry into such matters would go to the very core of the
business judgment made by the committee.”).
58. See id. at 1003.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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The Auerbach standard of judicial review of board decisions is a
one-step process in that the investigative procedures, but not the
63
substance of the decision, are analyzed by the court. Under this
philosophy, to delve into the substance of corporate decisions
“would be to emasculate the business judgment doctrine as applied
to the actions and determinations of the special litigation
64
committee.”
2. Delaware’s Two-Step Approach
Delaware’s philosophy on judicial review, laid out in Zapata
Corp. v. Maldonado, is less deferential in that it gives the court
discretion to exercise its own “independent business judgment”
65
whether to dismiss the case. Step one under Zapata requires the
court to “inquire into the independence and good faith of the
66
committee and the bases supporting its conclusions.” Instead of
receiving the traditional business-judgment presumption in its
favor, the board has the burden of establishing the independence,
67
good faith, and reasonableness of the committee’s determination.
If the corporation meets this burden, the court has a choice to
68
69
either 1) dismiss the action or 2) move into step two of the test.
In step two, the court “should determine, applying its own
independent business judgment, whether the motion should be
70
granted.”
This step considers the balance between “legitimate
corporate claims as expressed in a derivative stockholder suit” and
63. Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 23 (1993)
(stating if a litigation committee is disinterested and follows appropriate
procedures, Auerbach prevents a court from examining the merits of the board’s
decision).
64. Auerbach, 393 N.E.2d at 1002.
65. 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
66. Id. at 788.
67. Id. (stating that “the moving party should be prepared to meet the
normal burden under [Delaware Chancery Court] Rule 56 that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
dismiss as a matter of law”).
68. Id. at 789 (“If the Court determines either that the committee is not
independent or has not shown reasonable bases for its conclusions, or, if the
Court is not satisfied for other reasons relating to the process, including but not
limited to the good faith of the committee, the Court shall deny the corporation’s
motion.”).
69. Id. (“If, however, the Court is satisfied . . . that the committee was
independent and showed reasonable bases for good faith findings and
recommendations, the Court may proceed, in its discretion, to the next step.”).
70. Id.
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the best interest of the corporation as expressed by the
71
independent committee. At this stage, the court should consider
instances where the corporate actions meet the criteria of step one
72
but the “result does not appear to satisfy its spirit.” The court may
also weigh “matters of law and public policy in addition to the
73
corporation’s best interests.” Step two reflects the Zapata court’s
concern with respecting the power of a board to run the business
of a corporation while at the same time allowing meritorious
74
shareholder lawsuits to go forward.
It is important to note that Delaware only applies the Zapata
75
approach to judicial review in cases where shareholder demand is
76
excused due to futility or wrongful refusal.
Where demand is
rightly refused due to the sufficient independence of the board,
Delaware provides corporate boards the full protection of the
77
business judgment rule. In practice, applying the second Zapata
step may amount to overruling a board decision that seems
“egregious” or “irrational” even though board independence and
78
good faith satisfy step one.

71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 788 (“We thus steer a middle course between those cases which yield
to the independent business judgment of a board committee and this case as
determined below which would yield to unbridled plaintiff stockholder control.”).
75. In order to have standing to initiate derivative litigation, a shareholder
must first demand in writing that the board of directors commence the lawsuit in
question. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 1407 (defining “shareholder demand” and
noting that its purpose is to limit derivative litigation to situations where the
corporation unjustly failed to act for itself).
76. Demand futility is essentially a determination that the board of directors
is insufficiently disinterested and independent to be trusted to make a decision in
the best interests of the corporation. See, e.g., McKee v. Rogers, 156 A. 191,
193 (Del. Ch. 1931) (stating that “the officers are under an influence that sterilizes
discretion and could not be proper persons to conduct the litigation”). See also
DEL. R. CH. CT. 23.1 (“The complaint shall also allege with particularity the efforts,
if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the
directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort.”) (emphasis added).
77. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784 (stating that “[c]onsistent with the purpose of
requiring a demand, a board decision to cause a derivative suit to be dismissed as
detrimental to the company, after demand has been made and refused, will be
respected unless it was wrongful”).
78. BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 1720 (citing Carlton Invs. v. TLC Beatrice
Int’l Holdings, Inc., No. CIV.A.13950, 1997 WL 305829, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 30,
1997)).
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3. Minnesota’s Historical Approach
Minnesota courts historically have used the Auerbach one-step
79
approach to review board of director decisions. Until 1989, onestep review for independence and good faith in the special
80
litigation committee context was mandated by statute. In 1989,
the statute was repealed and its replacement did not address the
degree of deference to be afforded to special litigation committee
81
decisions. Subsequent court of appeals decisions refused to apply
82
a more stringent standard of review despite the statutory changes.
One-step review for independence and good faith remained the
standard in Minnesota notwithstanding some plaintiff arguments
that the standard should be strengthened in the direction of the
Zapata two-step approach that allows the court to review the
83
reasonableness of the decision.
D. Justifications of the Rule
The ultimate purpose that is served by the business judgment
rule is striking a balance between the authority of the board of
84
The
directors and its accountability to other stakeholders.
context of the derivative action sharpens the focus on this balance:
it is the corporate entity and not the nominal plaintiff that has
85
suffered the alleged wrong. Therefore, it follows that it should be
within the province of an independent board of directors to decide
whether or not to seek redress in the courts. Unlike in a direct
79. See, e.g., Black v. NuAire, Inc., 426 N.W.2d 203, 210-11 (Minn. Ct. App.
1988).
80. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.243 (1988) (“The good faith determinations of the
committee are binding upon the corporation and its directors, officers, and
shareholders.”), repealed by 1989 Minn. Laws ch. 172, § 11.
81. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.241 subd. 1 (2003).
82. See, e.g., Skoglund v. Brady, 541 N.W.2d 17, 21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995)
(stating that the repealing of section 302A.243 “was not intended to convey any
legislative intent with regard to the substance of the repealed section”). But see
Moutz, supra note 2, at 497 (arguing that legislative intent associated with the
repeal of section 302A.243 “[a]t the very least” requires courts to “substantively
consider alternatives to Auerbach”).
83. See Drilling v. Berman, 589 N.W.2d 503, 507-09 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999)
(rejecting plaintiff arguments that rely on decisions from jurisdictions applying
more stringent standards of review), see also Moutz, supra note 2, at 511
(advocating that Minnesota adopt the Zapata approach).
84. See STEPHAN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 208 (2002)
(noting the “tension between authority and accountability” inherent in
questioning board of director decisions and actions).
85. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 1380.
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lawsuit, corporate stakeholders have the option to “vote with their
86
feet” and dissociate themselves from the situation.
Within the essential tension between authority and
accountability, several specific theoretical justifications for the
business judgment rule emerge.
1. Encouraging Directors to Serve
Courts have repeatedly recognized that even informed, wellintentioned directors can make decisions that, with the benefit of
87
hindsight, later appear misguided.
If each incident of human
fallibility in board decisionmaking that results in a negative
outcome were to lead to personal liability for the individual board
members, it is easy to see that competent individuals might be
88
discouraged from accepting board positions.
This is especially
true given the massive scale of operation of many modern
corporations; director actions later judged grossly negligent with
the benefit of hindsight could lead to massive joint and several
89
liability for the entire loss.

86. Shareholders in closely held corporations are not an exception although
they would seem to be without the necessary liquidity to be able to “vote with their
feet.” However, they are protected by Minnesota closely held corporation law
under a completely different and much less deferential standard. See Kleinberger
& Bergmanis, supra note 33, at 1238 (“Minnesota’s leading close corporation cases
have featured egregious conduct and overwhelming evidence, and the decisions
exhibit none of the deference to management that characterizes business
judgment cases.”). Employee-owned stock may be under alienation restrictions
that prevent exiting in the face of corporate wrongdoing. See Moutz, supra note 2,
at 508-09. However, employee stock ownership does not carry with it the
assumption of diversification that is one of the important foundations of the
business judgment rule. See infra Part II.D.2.
87. See BLOCK ET AL., supra note 8, at 12 (citing numerous cases that mention
this justification for the business judgment rule).
88. A powerful example of this concern is reflected in the 1986 revision of
title 8, section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code to allow corporate bylaws to
exempt directors from liability for duty-of-care violations under certain
circumstances. See Diane L. Saltoun, Note, Fortifying the Directorial Stronghold:
Delaware Limits Director Liability, 29 B.C. L. REV. 481, 481-82 (1988). See also Smith v.
Van Gorkum, 488 A.2d 858, 884 (Del. 1985) (holding that directors were
personally liable for gross negligence for approving a merger without reasonable
investigation).
89. See William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of Director Due
Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and its Progeny as a
Standard of Review Problem, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 449, 457 (2002) (arguing risk/reward
ratio for directors discourages board service and risk-taking).
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2. Protecting Risk-Taking
Shareholders (or at least economically rational shareholders)
depend upon corporate growth and do not want directors to
90
behave in a risk-averse manner. Accordingly, courts appreciate
that risk-taking and innovation are important elements of
91
economic growth.
Without the threat of personal liability,
directors are free to honestly and rationally assess the risk involved
92
with any given opportunity and react accordingly. The fact that
investors are able to diversify their portfolio of investments and the
associated risks is additional justification for protecting director
93
risk-taking in individual corporations.
3. Courts Are Ill-Equipped
Courts reviewing board of director decisions often justify their
deference by stating that they are ill-equipped to second-guess an
94
informed board of directors. Judges often argue that they lack
special expertise and specific history with the corporation in
question or that they are missing an intangible “sense” for the
95
business and the particular marketplace. The business judgment
rule, from this perspective, protects board decisions because of the
special expertise of the directors and the relative lack of expertise
90. See Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int’l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1052 (Del. Ch. 1996)
(noting that shareholders should prefer investments that maximize the “risk
adjusted rate of return”).
91. See, e.g., Resolution Trust Corp. v. Blasdell, 930 F. Supp. 417, 423 (D. Ariz.
1994) (“[O]ur country’s corporate system depends to a degree on the willingness
of corporations to take risk.”).
92. Gagliardi, 683 A.2d at 1052 (stating that, given the scale of corporate
activities, even a small probability of liability has a significant chilling effect on
director risk taking). See also Allen, supra note 89, at 456-57 (arguing the massive
scale of potential liability inhibits risk-taking among directors).
93. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959, 968
n.16 (Del. Ch. 1996) (“The corporate form gets its utility in large part from its
ability to allow diversified investors to accept greater investment risk.”); see also
Peter V. Letsou, Implications of Shareholder Diversification on Corporate Law and
Organization: The Case of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179, 205
(2001) (arguing the business judgment rule appropriately lessens board concern
with minimizing diversifiable risk).
94. See, e.g., In re Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967 (review “would expose directors to
substantive second guessing by ill-equipped judges or juries”); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 630 (“the business judgment doctrine . . . is grounded in
the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infrequently called on to
evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments”).
95. See Douglas M. Branson, The Rule that Isn’t a Rule—The Business Judgment
Rule, 36 VAL. U. L. REV. 631, 637 (2002).
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96

of judges.
However, the premise that courts should grant deferential
review based upon a lack of specific expertise has been criticized on
the grounds that courts are willing to more strictly review decisions
97
in other complex domains, such as medical malpractice. Other
commentators argue that courts are ill-equipped based not upon a
lack of expertise, but rather because of the dangers of hindsight
bias and the lack of objective standards against which to evaluate
98
business decisions.
III. THE JANSSEN DECISION
A. Facts
The board of directors of the Minneapolis Police Relief
99
Association (MPRA) in 1996 and 1997 lost approximately $15
100
million in an investment in a company known as Technimar.
George Janssen and other members of MPRA (hereinafter Janssen)
brought a derivative lawsuit on behalf of MPRA against the law firm
101
of Best & Flanagan, which advised the MPRA board of directors.
Among other claims, the lawsuit alleged that the Best & Flanagan
attorneys who served as general counsel to MPRA were negligent in
failing to conduct a “due diligence” inquiry into the Technimar
102
investment.
As a response to the lawsuit, the MPRA board issued a
resolution appointing attorney Robert Murnane as “special
96. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. Time Inc., 1989 WL 79880, at *29
(Del.Ch. July 14, 1989) (stating the designation of authority to the board to make
business and financial decisions is one of the “important benefits of the business
judgment rule”).
97. See Jeffrey O’Connell & Andrew S. Boutros, Treating Medical Malpractice
Claims Under a Variant of the Business Judgment Rule, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 373, 426
(2002) (“Much of the reasoning that supports the existence of the business
judgment rule likewise applies to health care and other enterprises.”).
98. See William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1296 (2001) (hindsight
bias); Charles W. Murdock, Corporate Governance—The Role of Special Litigation
Committees, 68 WASH. L. REV. 79, 91 (1993) (“no available objective standard”).
99. MPRA is a Minnesota nonprofit corporation governed by a board of nine
directors that administers a pension plan for Minneapolis police officers hired
before June 15, 1980. See MINN. STAT. § 423B.01-.04 (2002).
100. Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 662 N.W.2d 876, 879 (Minn. 2003).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 879-80.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss4/10

16

Fellows: A Business or a Trust?: Janssen v. Best & Flanagan and Judicial R
FELLOWS- READY.DOC

5/20/2004 9:18 PM

2004] A BUSINESS OR A TRUST?: JANSSEN v. BEST & FLANAGAN

1519

103

counsel” to investigate Janssen’s claims.
The resolution
instructed Murnane to conduct an independent review of the
derivative lawsuit and determine on behalf of the board of directors
104
whether MPRA should join the lawsuit against Best & Flanagan.
In particular, the resolution instructed Murnane “not to
reinvestigate, verify or otherwise attempt to prove or disprove the
factual findings, determinations, events or circumstances”
described in two previous investigative reports and a set of
105
discovery materials from a related lawsuit.
Murnane was not
limited by the conclusions of the previous reports, but was
106
specifically instructed to “accept as correct” their factual findings.
Over the next few months Murnane reviewed “thousands of
pages of reports, documents and deposition transcripts” while
investigating the prospects of a malpractice lawsuit against Best &
107
Flanagan.
Murnane did not, however, conduct any of his own
108
investigation nor speak to the Janssen claimants and attorneys.
The report Murnane submitted to the MPRA board of directors on
September 26, 2000, concluded that “the totality of the materials
reviewed does not support a finding that Best & Flanagan
committed legal malpractice in its handling of the MPRA affairs”
and that “to spend money in the pursuit of a legal malpractice
claim against Best & Flanagan would not be prudent use of the
103. Id. at 880. While the board resolution labeled Murnane’s role as that of
“special counsel,” their ultimate intention was that he provide an independent
business judgment in the role of the board’s independent special litigation
committee. See infra Part III.B.2.A. The distinction between serving as “special
counsel” and as a special litigation committee is potentially significant because a
role as board counsel implies a possible past and/or future role in advising the
board and a particular fiduciary relationship with the directors themselves that
could color the independence of the counsel or committee’s conclusions. See
James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering the Outside
Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1084-85 (2003) (“earlier,
and particularly on-going, representation of the corporation raises questions
regarding independence and, hence, possible biasing of the information and
advice counsel may provide the committee”). The advice provided by legal
counsel may also be considered more limited in scope than that provided by a
special litigation committee responsible for providing a “business judgment.” See
Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 (“instead MPRA hired Murnane to serve as its special
counsel and he acted more like a legal advisor than a neutral decision maker”).
104. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 880.
105. Id. Two different law firms, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue (Jones Day) and
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP (Dorsey Whitney), already had conducted investigations
surrounding some of the issues and provided the written reports. Id. at 879.
106. Id. at 880.
107. Id.
108. Id.
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109

MPRA funds.”
The MPRA board then brought a motion to
dismiss the Janssen lawsuit on the theory that the court should
defer to the business judgment of Murnane who served as the
110
board’s special litigation committee.
The district court accepted Murnane as a special litigation
111
committee and applied the business judgment rule to his report.
The court tested Murnane’s investigation for independence and
good faith and concluded that the investigation failed even this
112
limited standard of review.
The court found Murnane’s
investigation lacked independence because “he was told by the
113
board of directors what to believe.” The court did not find good
faith because Murnane did not seek or receive input from the
114
plaintiffs.
In addition, the district court noted that it could not
determine whether Murnane offered legal advice or a business
115
judgment decision to the MPRA board.
Instead of denying MPRA’s motion to dismiss the lawsuit, the
district court postponed decision on the motion to allow MPRA to
modify the delegation of authority to its special litigation
116
committee.
The court stated that it would not grant business
judgment deference to the committee’s decision “until adequate
evidence of independence and good faith is submitted by the
MPRA, and until it is clear that Murnane has rendered a business
117
judgment.”
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. The district court appears to apply a strict version of the business
judgment rule (following the Auerbach one-step approach) by only examining the
investigative procedures undertaken by the special litigation committee. See id.
(“[the district court] examined only whether the committee conducted its
investigation with independence and good faith).
113. Id.
The district court concluded that the investigation lacked
independence because the board gave Murnane “only limited access to
information.” Janssen v. Best & Flanagan, 645 N.W.2d 495, 497 (Minn. Ct. App.
2002) [hereinafter “Janssen Appeal”].
114. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 880. (“the [district] court was left to assume that
such input was not sought because the board’s instructions limited the scope of
the investigation”).
115. Id. Operating as a “special counsel” offering legal advice does not meet
the standard of neutrality and independence required of a special litigation
committee of the board. See id. at 888.
116. Id. at 880-81. The court postponed a decision on the motion to allow
Murnane a second chance to investigate and not merely as a time extension to
supplement the record. See id. at 889 n.6.
117. Id. at 881.
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As a result, the MPRA board issued a second resolution in
December of 2000 declaring that Murnane was to function as a
special litigation committee, that no limits be imposed on his
investigation, and asking that Murnane exercise his business
judgment about whether it was in the best interest of MPRA to join
118
in the derivative lawsuit.
Murnane undertook a second
investigation during which he met with some of the plaintiffs and
119
Murnane’s second
the involved attorneys at Best & Flanagan.
report concluded that it would be a “poor business judgment” for
120
MPRA to join in the lawsuit against Best & Flanagan. MPRA then
121
renewed its motion to dismiss the derivative lawsuit. The district
court concluded that the special litigation committee’s second
122
investigation was conducted independently and in good faith.
The court deferred to Murnane’s business judgment according to
the business judgment rule and granted MPRA’s motion to dismiss
123
the lawsuit against Best & Flanagan.
The court of appeals reversed the district court and held that
124
the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act does not authorize
nonprofit organizations to create and empower special litigation
125
committees. The court of appeals also stated that, even assuming
MPRA could legally form a special litigation committee, Murnane’s
initial report failed the independence and good faith requirements
and the court would not have deferred to the committee’s findings
126
even after the second investigation and report.
The stated
deficiencies were that 1) the scope of Murnane’s investigation was
limited by the MPRA board, 2) Murnane failed to interview the
plaintiffs, and 3) Murnane’s conclusions amounted to legal advice
127
rather than business judgment.
118. The second resolution grants Murnane “complete independence” and
states that he “may undertake whatever good faith investigation he chooses.” Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. MINN. STAT. § 317A.241 subd. 1 (2002). See also discussion infra note 142.
125. Janssen Appeal, 645 N.W.2d at 498 (“authorizing the use of special
litigation committees by for-profit corporations and omitting any reference to
them for nonprofit corporations is a clear statement of legislative intent to treat
the business entities differently in this aspect of management”).
126. See id. at 500 (concluding that the two Murnane investigations considered
together failed the independence and good faith requirements).
127. Id. at 499-500 (listing the three district court findings on which the court
of appeals based its conclusion).
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B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals
128
decision that Murnane’s investigation did not meet the business
129
judgment threshold.
The supreme court decided the case in
three steps. The first step was determining whether the deferential
business judgment standard of review should be applied to board
130
of director decisions in a nonprofit corporation. The second was
131
deciding whether the Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act
prohibits a board of directors from establishing a special litigation
committee with authority to make decisions about derivative
132
litigation.
The third decision was whether Murnane, serving as
MPRA’s special litigation committee, displayed sufficient
independence and good faith to warrant the deferential standard
133
of review of the business judgment rule.
1. Nonprofits and the Business Judgment Rule
The court began by noting the balance that must be
maintained between the important goals of allowing a corporation
to control its own destiny and holding directors accountable by
134
allowing derivative lawsuits.
The two traditional justifications for
the business judgment standard are: 1) shielding directors’
reasonable risks is economically desirable to allow businesses to
attract risk-averse managers and adapt to changing markets and
135
trends, and 2) courts are generally ill-equipped to judge the
136
merits of business decisions.
All parties in the case presumed that the business judgment
rule would apply, and the court found no authority denying a
137
nonprofit corporation business judgment protection.
The court
128. Janssen Appeal, 645 N.W.2d at 500.
129. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 890.
130. See infra Part III.B.1.
131. MINN. STAT. ch. 317A (2002).
132. See authorities cited infra note 142.
133. See infra Part III.B.2.
134. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 881-82 (citing In re PSE & G S’holder Litig., 801
A.2d 295, 306 (N.J. 2002)).
135. See supra Part II.D.2.
136. See supra Part II.D.3.
137. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883 (citing Fairhope Single Tax Corp. v. Rezner,
527 So. 2d 1232, 1236 (Ala. 1987); Chun v. Bd. of Trs. of the Employees’ Ret. Sys.,
952 P.2d 1215, 1226-27 (Haw. 1998); Mahan v. Avera St. Luke’s, 621 N.W.2d 150,
154 (S.D. 2001); Rywalt v. Writer Corp., 526 P.2d 316, 317 (Colo. Ct. App. 1974);
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argued that, like for-profit corporations, nonprofits are
138
autonomous agents deserving to “control their own destiny.”
Additionally, directors of nonprofits “may take fewer risks than
would be optimal” if they had too much concern for liability for
139
well-intentioned decisions,
and that courts are no better
equipped to second-guess nonprofit board decisions than for-profit
140
board decisions.
Finally, the court reasoned that judges should
no more insert themselves between disputing factions of nonprofits
than between dissatisfied shareholders and boards of for-profit
141
corporations.
Concluding that the two business judgment rule
justifications presented earlier apply in the nonprofit context as
well, the court held that nonprofit boards are also protected by the
142
rule.
2. Applying the Business Judgment Standard
The court separately addressed the first board resolution and
investigation and the second resolution and investigation allowed
143
by the district court.
a. First Investigation
The court set out the “minimum” standard that must be met in

Scheuer Family Found. Inc. v. 61 Assoc., 582 N.Y.S.2d 662, 663 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992); Soloman v. Edgewater Yacht Club. Inc., 519 N.E.2d 429, 431 (Ohio Mun.
1987); Dockside Ass’n, Inc. v. Detyens, 352 S.E.2d 714, 716 (S.C. Ct. App. 1987);
Burke v. Tenn. Walking Horse Breeders’ & Exhibitors’ Ass’n, No. 01A01-9611-CH0511, 1997 WL 277999 at *9, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997); John v. John, 450 N.W.2d
795, 801-02 (Wis. Ct. App. 1989)).
138. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883.
139. Id. See also supra Part II.D.2.
140. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883. See also supra Part II.D.3.
141. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883.
142. Id. The supreme court also reversed the court of appeals holding that
nonprofit boards are not permitted to grant authority to special litigation
committees. Id. at 884. The Minnesota Nonprofit Corporations Act states that
committees appointed by a nonprofit board are “subject at all times to the
direction and control of the board.” MINN. STAT. § 317A.241 subd. 1 (2002). This
language would appear to prohibit granting the type of authority necessary to
establish independence in the business judgment rule context. See Janssen, 662
N.W.2d at 885 (noting that a strict reading would “make true independence
impossible”). In construing the statute, the court reasoned that there are “no
characteristics of nonprofits that justify treating nonprofit and for-profit
corporations differently in terms of their ability to delegate board authority.” Id.
at 886.
143. See supra Part III.A.
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order for a litigation committee decision to deserve protection
144
The committee must act in
under the business judgment rule.
good faith and with sufficient independence from the board to
145
dispassionately review the derivative lawsuit.
Filling a “mere
advisory role” is not enough: the board must delegate to the
146
committee the full power to control the litigation.
The court noted two aspects of Murnane’s initial investigation
to illustrate that he lacked sufficient independence from the
147
board.
First, the resolution explicitly restricted the scope of his
148
Murnane was told to rely on facts
factual investigation.
developed during other law firms’ earlier investigations of related
149
legal issues.
Second, the court concluded that Murnane saw his
role as being determined by the title “special counsel” rather than
as a special litigation committee tasked to provide an independent
150
business judgment that would bind the board.
Supporting this
conclusion is the fact that Murnane did not interview Janssen or his
151
The court noted that Murnane’s conclusions sounded
counsel.
152
like legal advice rather than business judgment.
Two features of Murnane’s procedures pointed to a lack of
153
First, he failed “a fundamental task in
good faith investigation.
reaching an informed decision” by never interviewing Janssen or

144. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888. The court does not adopt a particular version
of the business judgment rule in its analysis. Instead, it applies the “good faith”
and “independence” tests as elements common to all state “variations” upon the
rule. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (calling delegation of power to control the litigation a “key factor in
evaluating independence”).
147. Id. The court analyzed independence and good faith as a conjunctive test
with two parts, but applied some facts about the investigation to both the
independence and good faith parts of the test. See supra notes 109-119 and
accompanying text.
148. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court does not give a definitive indication of the characteristics
that define “legal advice” versus an “independent business judgment.” However, it
appears that business judgment must at least consider information from the
perspective of other parties outside of the board and must consider a broader
range of factors relevant to operating a business in making a decision. See infra
note 157.
153. The court defines the good faith element as requiring “a good faith
attempt to deduce the best interest of MPRA with respect to the litigation against
Best & Flanagan.” Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 889.
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154

his counsel.
Second, Murnane failed to consider “all of the
155
germane benefits and detriments” of this litigation for MPRA.
Murnane concluded that the materials reviewed “do[] not support
a finding that Best & Flanagan committed legal malpractice” and
that spending money in pursuit of a malpractice claim “would not
156
be prudent use of MPRA funds.”
The court viewed this as the
“language . . . of a special counsel evaluating the likelihood of a
legal victory” instead of a “much more comprehensive weighing
and balancing of factors” expected in “reasoned business
157
decisions.”
Based upon these arguments, the court held that
Murnane’s initial investigation “lacked the independence and good
158
faith necessary to merit deference from this court.”
b. Second Investigation
Although the district court deferred MPRA’s motion to dismiss
and allowed its board to issue a second resolution and empower
Murnane to conduct a second investigation, the supreme court
159
refused to consider the second, “improved” investigation.
Although finding no directly relevant precedent, the court argued
that procedure dictates a derivative lawsuit should proceed to trial
if the board fails to meet its burden of proving independence and
160
good faith.
The court stated that an investigation that is so
restricted in scope or so shallow as to constitute a pretext raises
questions of good faith and “would never be shielded” by the
161
business judgment rule.
The court found a second justification for refusing to consider
the second investigation in the principles behind the business
162
judgment rule.
The rule attempts to strike a balance between
allowing corporations to control their own destiny and permitting
163
meritorious shareholder lawsuits to go forward.
The court
154. Id.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id. (internal quotes omitted).
157. Id. (listing factors appropriately considered such as how joining or
quashing the lawsuit could affect: 1) MPRA’s economic health, 2) member/board
relations, 3) public relations, and 4) other factors common to reasoned business
decisions).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 890.
160. Id. at 889 (citing Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58 (Mass. 1990)).
161. Id. (quoting Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1003 (N.Y. 1979)).
162. Id. at 889-90.
163. Id. at 890 (citing Kaplan v. Wyatt, 484 A.2d 501, 508 (Del. Ch. 1984)).
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argued that allowing boards “to continually improve their
investigation to bolster their business decision” creates a situation
164
where shareholder rights are “effectively nullified.”
The court
concluded that the district court erred in deferring the motion to
dismiss and permitting the board to remedy defects in their
165
delegation of authority to Murnane.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. For-Profit Review: Hints of Auerbach
While declining to formally adopt any particular version of the
business judgment rule, the supreme court in Janssen leaves some
significant hints that it favors the deferential Auerbach one-step
166
The first hint is in the reasoning the court uses to
approach.
reject consideration of the MPRA’s second resolution and
167
Murnane’s second investigation.
The court presents very strict
procedural requirements in its “one strike and you are out” holding
and equates flaws in a committee investigation with the
investigation itself being merely pretextual and, therefore,
168
unworthy of judicial deference.
The fact that the court takes
such a strong procedural stand is possibly indicative of a preference
for the (strictly procedural) Auerbach formulation of the business
169
judgment rule. A court leaning toward the Zapata formulation of
the rule can afford to be less strict in reviewing the investigative
procedures because optional review of the substance of the
170
decision for reasonableness is available.
In contrast, Auerbach

164. Id. This argument applies to any requirement that is purely procedural
because the procedure can be continually modified and improved while the
substance of the decision remains the same. Therefore, if the court defers
decision on the motion to dismiss while the board continually refines the
investigative procedures until they meet court scrutiny, the plaintiff will never have
a chance to bring the suit forward.
165. Id.
166. See supra Part II.C.1.
167. See supra Part III.B.2.b.
168. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 889 (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994,
1003 (N.Y. 1979)).
169. In contrast, the dissent argues that the second resolution and
investigation are completely appropriate by appealing to an analogy to summary
judgment motions generally; denial does not become “law of the case” that
precludes a renewed motion. Id. at 890 (Hanson, J., dissenting).
170. See supra Part II.C.2.
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171

review provides no such “back up plan.”
The second hint that the court is oriented toward deferential,
one-step review is contained in the language the court uses in
refusing to adopt a particular standard of review for nonprofit
172
board decisions.
The court states that it “need not reach the
question of whether a more exacting standard of judicial review
may be appropriate for nonprofit corporations than in the case of
173
for-profit corporations.”
There are certainly other ways that this
proposition could be phrased that would not so strongly imply that
for-profit boards are currently entitled to deferential review. The
consistent use of one-step review in court of appeals decisions
174
serves as the context for this statement by the supreme court.
Given the emphasis that the court places on board
175
autonomy, deferential review is the appropriate standard for
Minnesota for-profit corporations. While a hot-button corporate
issue or particularly compelling facts may tempt a court to reach
beyond one-step business judgment review and address the
substance of the board’s decision, it is important to remember the
statutory command that “[t]he business and affairs of a corporation
176
shall be managed by or under the direction of a board.” Similar
corporate constituency statutes exist in most states and, when
respected, represent the legal foundation for the tremendous
177
economic growth that has occurred in the United States.
Deferential, one-step review properly respects this statutory
concession of authority to the board. It also promotes appropriate
risk-taking by individual board members and healthy group
178
processes by the board acting in concert.
171. See supra Part II.C.1. Other commentators have criticized the Janssen
“one-strike” approach as inconsistent with the business judgment rule underlying
purpose of preserving board autonomy. See Moutz, supra note 2, at 506 (“courts
should have the discretion to permit additional investigations . . . provided that
the committee proceeded independently and in good faith”).
172. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 888 n.5.
173. Id. The implication is that less exacting review is appropriate in the case
of for-profit corporations.
174. See supra Part II.C.3.
175. Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 881-82.
176. MINN. STAT. § 302A.201 subd. 1 (2002).
177. See Eric W. Orts, The Complexity and Legitimacy of Corporate Law, 50 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1565, 1595-96 (1993) (discussing generally the relationship between
corporate legal structures and long-term economic growth in the United States).
178. See discussion supra Part II.D.1-2 (discussing risk taking by individual
board members); see also Stephan M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group
Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1, 50 (2002).
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The Janssen decision hints that Minnesota still applies one-step
review to for-profit board decisions. For the sound economic
reasons listed above, the court should confirm those hints by
applying deferential business judgment review when provided the
opportunity in the future.
B. Nonprofit Review: A Business or a Trust?
In deciding to apply the business judgment rule to Minnesota
nonprofits, the court invokes the rule justifications that 1) risktaking should be encouraged and 2) courts are ill-equipped to
179
review board decisions.
The court also notes that organizations
are autonomous agents that should be allowed to control their own
180
It appears that the court is arguing that nonprofit and
destiny.
for-profit entities are so similar with respect to characteristics that
are relevant to applying the business judgment rule that the rule
181
should apply to both. The problem with this argument is the fact
that nonprofit entities are extremely diverse: some nonprofits
182
operate very much like for-profits and some are quite different.
In turn, risk-averse directors take excessive precautions and avoid risky
decisions. If the risk of shareholder litigation causes some members of
the team to exercise more care than is optimal, the team must now
monitor not only the quality of the decision-making inputs coming from
each member, but also the risk that any given member is unusually risk
averse and thus especially subject to having his or her inputs into the
team processes skewed by the fear of liability.
Id.
179. See Janssen, 662 N.W.2d at 883.
180. Id. (citing Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01 (N.Y. 1979)).
181. These characteristics of nonprofits and for-profits are the ones that relate
to the traditional justifications for the business judgment rule: encouraging board
members to serve, protecting risk-taking, and realizing that courts are ill-equipped
to substitute their judgment for the board’s judgment. A fair number of
jurisdictions have established a blanket rule that the corporate duty-of-care
standard applies to nonprofits. See Daniel L. Kurtz, BOARD LIABILITY: A GUIDE FOR
NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 23 (1988).
182. See Denise Ping Lee, The Business Judgment Rule: Should It Protect Nonprofit
Directors?, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 925, 928 (2003) (arguing for less deferential judicial
review for nonprofit boards).
The world of nonprofits has changed significantly over time; some
have continued to operate as small, neighborhood charitable
organizations, while others have transformed themselves into large,
quasi-business operations, similar to their behemoth corporate
counterparts. As with any group of this size, nonprofit activities vary
widely, with organizations ranging from traditional charities, such as
neighborhood soup kitchens and the Red Cross, to hospitals run in a
manner similar to for-profit hospitals, to even the National Football
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An approach that is more appropriate in light of the varied
nature of nonprofit corporations is to examine the characteristics
of the organization and determine whether it operates more like a
for-profit entity or more like a traditional nonprofit. If the
organization is clearly a traditional nonprofit, more exacting review
183
such as an ordinary negligence standard may be appropriate. In
this way, a nonprofit where the director’s role is more similar to a
trustee than to a for-profit director would be subject to the more
184
exacting standard of judicial review of a trustee.
The nonprofit’s characteristics that would be relevant to this
determination are the characteristics that relate to the traditional
justifications for the business judgment rule. For example: whether
the directors are expected to be risk-averse, whether the
shareholder/members are able to diversify their risks by removing
funds or controlling investment decisions, and whether the
shareholder/members have other remedies available such as
leaving the organization without significant penalty or voting out
directors. As a practical matter, establishing these characteristics
could be a pleading requirement that burdens the plaintiff.
Applying this approach to Janssen would require a remand to
district court to establish relevant facts about MPRA. The most
important considerations are likely to be Janssen’s reasonable
expectations about the type of risk-taking that the board was
authorized to undertake and whether Janssen was able to diversify
his retirement funds outside of MPRA or remove them entirely. It
is likely that MPRA was expected to undertake sufficient risk
regarding its pension fund investments so as to provide reasonable
185
capital growth to its retirees. If this fact alone is true it becomes a
strong argument for deferential review of MPRA board decisions in
order to not inhibit appropriate investment management risktaking.
League.
Id.
183. See id. at 927.
184. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174 (1959). “The trustee is under
a duty to the beneficiary in administering the trust to exercise such care and skill
as a man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own property.”
Id.
185. Information about the MPRA’s investment strategies or goals or the
mission of the pension fund is not found in the organizations bylaws. See
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE RELIEF ASSOCIATION, FIRST RESTATED BY-LAWS OF THE
MINNEAPOLIS POLICE RELIEF ASSOCIATION, available at http://www.mpra.net/bylaws.
htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2004).
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V. CONCLUSION
Deficiencies in the MPRA special litigation committee
investigation of the merits of the derivative lawsuit against Best &
Flanagan allowed the supreme court to decide Janssen without
reaching the issue of which version of the business judgment rule
applies to Minnesota nonprofit corporations. In reasoning the
decision, the court strongly hinted that deferential, one-step review
applies to Minnesota for-profit corporations. This presumed stance
is appropriate given the importance of board autonomy and board
authority in taking reasonable corporate risks for long-term growth.
The court holds that the business judgment rule also applies to
Minnesota nonprofits. This decision is problematic because of the
great variety of forms nonprofit corporations take. A more
appropriate approach analyzes the relevant characteristics of the
particular nonprofit to establish whether it is more like a trust or a
business. Nonprofits displaying trust characteristics should be
afforded less deferential, ordinary negligence review for board
decisions. The Janssen fact-finding upon remand should focus on
reasonable expectations of board risk-taking and the ability of
members to diversify their investment risk. If the MPRA is
expected to take sufficient risks to achieve long-term capital
growth, their board is most likely entitled to deferential business
judgment rule review.
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